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In choosing fixed over flexible exchange rates, a country gives up the right
to determine its own rate of inflation and thus the amount of revenue
collected by the inflation tax. This constraint imposes an excess burden
that should be included in the cost-benefit analysis of the choice of
exchange rate regime. If the country goes further by giving up its seignior-
age and using a foreign money in place of the domestic money, it loses
more tax revenue and has to adjust government spending and other taxes
accordingly. The choice of exchange rate regime is thus related to ques-
tions discussed in optimal inflation tax analysis.
This paper presents an analysis of the optimal inflation tax in section
3.1.
1 The consequences of a constraint on the rate of money creation are
studied in section 3.2, while section 3.3 analyzes the effects of the loss of
revenue from the inflation tax. Section 3.4 presents an interpretation of
the preceding analysis as applied to alternative exchange rate regimes.
The interest in the paper derives from the explicit calculation of optimal
inflation taxes for a specific utility function and production function,
embodied in an intertemporal framework, as well as from the application
to exchange rate regimes.
3.1 The Optimal Inflation Tax
The representative infinitely lived family in the economy is growing at
rate n and derives utility from private consumption, from the services
Stanley Fischer is a professor in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research;
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1. Phelps (1973) is the original reference in this tradition. See also Aghevli (1977),
Drazen (1979), and Brock and Turnovsky (1980) for further developments.
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provided by holding real balances,
2
3 from leisure, as well as from con-
sumption of a public good. There are no nondistorting taxes, and the
government finances its expenditures through the issue of money and
taxes on labor income. It is convenient to assume there is no capital.
The utility function of the representative household is
(1) V= j; U(c,m,x,g)e-
bsds,
where c is per capita consumption, m is per capita real balances, x = 1- €
is leisure (€ is labor supply), and g is government spending; 8 > 0 is the
discount rate or rate of time preference.
The household budget constraint is
(2) c + m + (tr + n) m = w(l - t) €,
where TT is the rate of inflation, n the growth rate of family population, w
is the wage rate, and t the tax rate on labor income. It is assumed
throughout that w is constant.
4
The household maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint (2),
taking g, government spending, as given. The government budget con-
straint is
(3) g = twi + (M/PN) = tw£ + m + (IT + n) m,
where M/PN is the flow of real resources, per capita, the government
obtains by printing money. (N is population.)
The analysis proceeds in stages. First, the household optimization
problem, taking TT and t as given, is solved. I then note that there is no
inherent dynamics in this model, since there is no capital accumulation,
and that for a given rate of nominal money growth, 6, the rational
expectations solution for the price level will have the economy jump
initially to its steady state, in which m = 0 and IT = 0 — n. The remainder
of the analysis is therefore conducted under the assumption that the
economy is in steady state.
2. Fischer (1974) discusses the issue of money in the production (and utility) function,
which is emphasized by Thomas Sargent in his comments on this paper and the paper by
Guillermo Ortiz appearing later in this volume. The essential point is that of revealed
preference: putting money in the utility (or production) function is equivalent to postulating
a demand function for money. Deeper analyses of the demand for money require a more
detailed specification of the transactions environment. It is well known that the choice of a
medium of exchange in any model of transactions is extremely delicate in that there is no
good reason for one asset rather than another to serve as medium of exchange. The
Kareken-Wallace (1981) indeterminacy of exchange rates in a multicountry world repre-
sents the same logical difficulty as that of accounting for the use of noninterest-bearing
currency in a single country where there are alternative assets. This problem was stressed by
Keynes (1936) and Samuelson (1947) as the essential difficulty of monetary theory. In the
light of these difficulties at the theoretical level, it is remarkable that there is so little
difficulty in getting private economic agents to use the domestic currency: it takes extraor-
dinary rates of inflation before there is flight from a given national currency. The theoretical
challenge is to explain this phenomenon.
3. For use of a similar framework in a multiasset context, see Fischer (1972).
4. If capital were included in the model, w would become variable.61 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates
At the second stage, a Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to study
the optimal tax problem. For any given level of g, there is an optimal
combination of taxes to finance the spending. The optimal tax combina-
tion and its variation as g changes are examined. Finally, I ask what the
optimal level of g is, under the assumption that the government maxi-
mizes (1), subject to the private sector behavioral functions and its
budget constraint (3).
The first order conditions for maximization of (1) subject to (2) are
(4) 0 = Uc - X,
(5) 0 = Ux- Xw(l - 0,
(6) I = (TT + n + h)\ - Um,
where X is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint (2) and,
from (4), is also the marginal utility of consumption.
5
Now, consideration of equilibrium paths in which it, the rate of infla-
tion in (6), is equated to the rate of inflation implied by solution of the full
system (4)-(6) for given constant 0 will show that the only path that
converges to a steady state is one that goes immediately to that steady
state.
6 Thus we can set k = 0 and work henceforth with the steady state
system, (4), (5), and
(6') 0 = Um - X (IT + n + 8).
The general optimal tax analysis approach could now be applied, but I
prefer to use a specific, Cobb-Douglas, example to illustrate the relevant
considerations.
7 Assume
(7) U(c, m, x, g) = <*nPx*tf, with a, p, 7, e>0,
and <x + p + 7 + e<l.
Then, using equations (4)-(6') and the budget constraint (2):
c= a + (pe/e + 8) + 7 dt
(9) m = P»(l-Q€^
( + p ( p 7) 8(a + 7) dt 50
(10) € = f*1 1, 0,0.
a + (pe/8 + 8) + 7] dt <90
The properties of the functions (8)-(10) are unsurprising, except for
the absence of a wage or labor tax effect on labor supply. This last result is
5. For a similar optimization problem, see Fischer (1979).
6. See Fischer (1979) for the type of argument needed.
7. The Cobb-Douglas form does not permit the level of government spending to affect
the rates of substitution between other pairs of variables. Thus a utility function like (7)
cannot, for instance, reflect the notion that government and private consumption are close
substitutes.62 Stanley Fischer
a consequence of the canceling of income and substitution effects and
ensures, in this model, that total taxes from labor rise as the income tax
rate increases.
Note from (9) that for an interior maximum with m > 0, it is required
that
(11) 0&(a + 7)
a + |5 + 7
which also implies that 0 + 8 > 0.
The government budget constraint (3) implies that for any tax rates, t
and 0,
(12) g = w
where I have substituted from (9) and (10) into (3). It is convenient to
define
(13) M.= 4=,
which is a measure of the share of government spending in potential
(full-time work) output.
Different combinations of 0 and t can be used to finance any feasible
level of government spending. Locus BB in figure 3.1 shows those com-
binations in (t, 0) space for a given value of |x. The locus does not
necessarily cross the t and 0 axes, since there is a maximum |x that can be
financed through exclusive use of either the income tax or seigniorage. In
particular, if there is no use of seigniorage (0 = 0), then it is required that
a + 7 t=
 L|x.
a
When t = 1, the government is using the income tax to appropriate all
income, and government spending is given by:
8
(14)
^ a + 7
In the case of nonuse of the income tax, maximum g is achieved as 0
goes to infinity, and
(I
5) M-2 = —^TT— •
Since (3 is likely to be small relative to a and 7, the maximum steady state
8. I am grateful to Olivier Blanchard for correcting an error at this point in a previous
draft.63 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates
t=1
- B'
Fig. 3.1 Alternative tax combinations to finance a given level of gov-
ernment spending.
(g/w€) that can be financed by seigniorage alone is also likely to be small.
Use of the inflation tax does increase the level of output through its effect
on labor supply; thus when the inflation tax alone is used to finance
government spending, the level of output is higher than when the income
tax is used to finance the same level of government spending.
The maximum attainable level of government spending when both
taxes are used, |x3, is obtained by setting t = 1 and letting 9 go to infinity in
(12):
(16)
a + 3 + 764 Stanley Fischer
Whether the BB locus crosses the t and 9 axes as shown in figure 3.1
depends on the value of (x. For the BB locus in figure 3.1, jx is less than
both fix and u,2. As u, increases, the locus shifts up to the right. The B'B'
locus applies for a level of government spending larger than u,2 but
smaller than |xx and |x3.
The BB locus shows combinations of t and 8 that can be used to finance
a given level of government spending. But of course only one of these
combinations will be the optimal tax combination for given (x. Given t, 0,
and g, the consumer demand and supply functions (8)-(10) imply the
flow of utility








where £ is a constant of no significance.
The marginal disutilities of the two tax rates, and hence the slope of an
indifference curve in (6, t) space, are obtained from (17), treating g as
given. Then, equating the slope of an indifference curve to that of the
budget constraint BB and solving, pairs of 0 and t that are optimal for
each level of government spending are obtained. This optimal tax locus is
given by:
(18) at [(a + p + 7) 0 + 8(a + 2y)] - a0(a + 3 + 7)
= 8 [a(a + 7) — P7].
The optimal tax locus, TT, is shown in figure 3.2. Its slope is
dt - (1 - 0 (« + P + 7)
(19)
0(a + 3 + 7) + 8(a + 27) '
which is positive. Thus both the seigniorage and the labor income tax
increase as government spending rises. Corresponding to each point on
rris a level of government spending. Whether the TT locus crosses the
0 = 0 axis at t>0, as shown, depends on the sign of a(a + 7) - 37, the
right-hand side of (18). Since 3 is related to the share of spending on real
balance rentals, it is likely to be small; thus the case shown in figure 3.2 is
more likely.
The optimum government policy is found by choosing the best point on
figure 3.2. This is done by maximizing (17) with respect to 0 and t after
substituting for g from the government budget constraint (12): the resul-
tant expression for the optimal rate of seigniorage is
(20) 0
2(a + 3)(a + 3 + 7) + 08 [(a + 3)(a + 7) + a(a + 3 + 7) - 7c]
+ 8
2[a(a + 7) - 7(3 + e)] = 0.
Three comments about (20) are in order. First, assuming that the
coefficient of 0 in the equation is positive, there will be no positive root of
(20) unless65 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates
Fig. 3.2 The optimal tax locus TT.
e).
This condition requires government spending optimally to take a rela-
tively large share of output. For values of the parameters that generate
approximately the observed ratios of consumption to income, consump-
tion to real balances, labor to leisure, and government spending to
consumption in the U.S. economy, the condition is not satisfied. Thus the
current analysis does not give support to the notion that optimal rates of
seigniorage can be high. In part, no doubt, this is a result of the functional
form being used.




9. For instance, the likelihood of positive use of seigniorage at the optimum would be
increased if real balances entered the utility function in Stone-Geary form as (m-m). See
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) for an example, In the present paper use of the Stone-Geary
form turns (20) into a quartic equation and thus is not appealing. Barro (1971) argues that
optimal rates of inflation are low.
10. In unpublished work, Guillermo Calvo and Jacob Frenkel have shown that the66 Stanley Fischer
Second, nowhere has the analysis had occasion to enter the variables 0
and TT separately. Thus in this example the optimal use of seigniorage is
independent of the rate of population growth.
1
1 The optimal steady state
rate of inflation therefore falls one for one as the population growth rate
rises.
Third, the optimal rate of seigniorage use, 0, is directly proportional to
8, the rate of time preference. If optimal 0 is positive, it increases
proportionately with 8, which may be thought of in this context as the
interest rate. If optimal 0 is negative, then higher 8 would mean a lower
optimal rate of inflation, which is consistent with the optimal quantity of
money argument.
3.2 Constrained Optimal Taxation
The optimal position for this economy is a point like A in figure 3.2. In
this section I consider the effects of constraining the rate of money
growth, 0, to a level 0. Such a constraint would apply, for example, if the
exchange rate were kept fixed. In terms of figure 3.2, the government is
constrained to the locus FF. Two questions about the rate of income tax
to be used are considered.
First, we could ask what rate tf would be necessary to maintain any
specified level of government spending, for instance, the optimal level
associated with point A. That is a purely technical question to be
answered using the budget constraint (12). The implied point B is shown
illustratively, in figure 3.2.
The second question is: What, given the constraint 0, is the optimal
level of government spending? The answer is found by maximizing (17)
with respect to t, after substituting in for g from the government budget
equation (12) and treating 0 as a constant. The resultant locus, giving
optimal t (by implication from (12), also g) as a function of 0, is
a + 0 + e a(a + p + e) (0 + 8)
This optimal income tax locus, tt, in figure 3.2 is negatively sloped and lies
above TT to the left of the optimal point A. When some seigniorage is
taken away from the government, it optimally reduces government
spending and increases its use of the labor income tax. Given the con-
straint on 0 in figure 3.2, the optimal point is C.
Figure 3.3 shows the utility implications of giving up control over 0.
The curve describes the level of utility traced out along tt. Point C shows
introduction of a banking system with fractional reserves in an optimal inflation tax analysis
increases the optimal inflation rate.
11. Cf. Friedman (1971).67 Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates
Fig. 3.3 Utility implications of alternative monetary and exchange
arrangements.
the utility level corresponding to optimal policy when 0 is fixed at 0. The
utility level corresponding to B, where government spending is held to
the level that obtains at A, lies below C. The utility loss from A to C can
be compensated for by some amount of resources, which is not in general
equal to the amount of seigniorage lost in moving from A to C. In the
context of discussion of fixed exchange rates, that amount of compensa-
tion is the excess burden of accepting fixed exchange rates.
3.3 Losing the Inflation Revenue
Finally, suppose that the revenue generated by seigniorage is no longer
available to the government. This would occur if, for instance, a country
used a foreign money. The maximal attainable level of utility is certainly
less than that shown by C in figure 3.3. The government loses a source of
revenue and will again optimally reduce government spending below its
level at C and increase the income tax rate above its level at C The
optimal tax rate is now
(22) t =
which is independent of 0; however, government spending optimally
increases with 0. This occurs because an increase in 0, which may be
thought of as an increase in the rate of inflation, increases labor supply
and thus income tax revenue.
Corresponding to the higher rate of income tax when the government
loses seigniorage, optimal holdings of real balances will be lower than the68 Stanley Fischer
level corresponding to point Cin figure 3.3, even though the inflation rate
is the same. Point D in figure 3.3 represents the maximum utility attain-
able when the government loses its seigniorage.
3.4 Exchange Rate Regimes
The above analysis is relevant to one aspect of the differences among
exchange rate regimes. The full optimal tax analysis presented in section
3.1 describes the options available when the exchange rate is flexible. The
excess burden imposed by the constraint on 8 in section 3.2 describes one
of the costs of adopting a fixed rate regime which, however, uses domestic
money. The rate of money creation 6 in section 3.2 is that rate required to
maintain fixity of the exchange rate. Section 3.3 calculates the further
cost of giving up domestic money, using instead a foreign money. The
rate of inflation in this case will also be consistent with the rate of money
growth 0.
The ranking of utilities of these sets of arrangements is unambiguous.
Free choice of the rate of money growth is preferred to the situation
where the rate of money growth is fixed at 0, with use of domestic money.
Utility at point A in figure 3.3 is undoubtedly above (or no lower than)
that at C. Use of a foreign money imposes a further cost, implying that
point D is below C in figure 3.3.
It is entirely reasonable to ask whether the seigniorage considerations
emphasized in this paper are of any empirical significance. The possibly
surprising answer is yes. For the industrial countries over the period of
1960-1978, seigniorage provided 5.7 percent of government revenue,
representing 1 percent of GNP on average. In some other countries, such
as Greece and Spain, seigniorage revenue exceeded 10 percent of govern-
ment revenue.
1
2 Such high rates of seigniorage are perhaps nonoptimal in
the light of the preceding analysis, but they certainly indicate that sei-
gniorage is a factor to be taken into account in the choice of an exchange
rate regime. But of course it is not the only consideration determining the
desirability of alternative exchange arrangements.
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